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Abstract—A massive threat to the modern and complex IC
production chain is the use of untrusted off-shore foundries
which are able to infringe valuable hardware design IP or
to inject hardware Trojans causing severe loss of safety and
security. Similarly, market dominating SRAM-based FPGAs are
vulnerable to both attacks since the crucial gate-level netlist can
be retrieved even in field for the majority of deployed device
series. In order to perform IP infringement or Trojan injection,
reverse engineering (parts of) the hardware design is necessary to
understand its internal workings. Even though IP protection and
obfuscation techniques exist to hinder both attacks, the security of
most techniques is doubtful since realistic capabilities of reverse
engineering are often neglected.
The contribution of our work is twofold: first, we carefully
review an IP watermarking scheme tailored to FPGAs and
improve its security by using opaque predicates. In addition, we
show novel reverse engineering strategies on proposed opaque
predicate implementations that again enables to automatically
detect and alter watermarks. Second, we demonstrate automatic
injection of hardware Trojans specifically tailored for third-party
cryptographic IP gate-level netlists. More precisely, we extend
our understanding of adversary’s capabilities by presenting how
block and stream cipher implementations can be surreptitiously
weakened.
Keywords—Hardware Reverse Engineering, Hardware Trojans,
FPGAs, Crypto Trojans, IP Infringement, IP watermarking
I. INTRODUCTION
To assure security and safety of any modern application, it
is of crucial importance that the underlying cryptographic prim-
itive is not compromised. Given that most crypto algorithms in
use such as the Suite B ciphers [1] are robust against traditional
attacks, i.e. brute-force and cryptanalysis, adversaries are often
forced to exploit implementation attacks. The most prominent
examples of implementation attacks are Side-Channel Analysis
(SCA) and Fault Injection (FI). Both attack families have been
investigated in great detail in the Application Specific Integrated
Circuit (ASIC) and Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
context over the last two decades, in the scientific community
as well as in industry, cf. [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. Even though
SCA and FI countermeasures are certainly not solved problems,
there is a sound understanding of attacks and countermeasures.
Another prominent class of attacks attempt to weaken the
security by manipulating the underlying hardware, often referred
to as Trojans. In spite of extensive research [7], [8], there
are still open questions regarding the practicability of many
proposed Trojans since either adversarial access to the source
code is assumed [9] or crucial reverse engineering steps are
neglected [10]. However, in real-world scenarios the adversary
(e.g., a malicious foundry) faces daunting tasks of: (1) reverse
engineering high-level information from a gate-level netlist,
(2) overcoming possible Intellectual Property (IP) protection
mechanisms, (3) identifying the security-critical modules, (4)
followed by the actual Trojan insertion in the target design.
Understanding the feasibility and complexity of these steps is
crucial for a sound estimation of the threat posed by hardware
manipulations and more importantly, aid with developing sound
countermeasures against Trojans.
Goals and Contributions. In this paper, we focus on
destructive aspects of reverse engineering. Our goal is to
demonstrate the practicability of IP infringement and hardware
Trojan injection for third-party gate-level netlists of market-
dominating Static Random Access Memory (SRAM)-based
FPGAs. To this end, we first review the security of a constraint-
based IP watermarking scheme specifically tailored for FPGAs
and subsequently we show general improvements to increase
the security against reverse engineering. We then demonstrate
the automation of hardware Trojan injection in third-party gate-
level netlists of cryptographic designs. To highlight devastating
consequences of hardware Trojans for both block ciphers
and stream ciphers, we selected the standardized and widely-
used Present block cipher and A5/1 stream cipher. Our main
contributions are:
• IP Infringement. In our first case study (Sect. III),
we carefully analyze the security of constraint-based
watermarking tailored to FPGAs and show how to auto-
matically identify and tamper watermarks. Additionally,
we present novel improvements to mitigate reverse
engineering by use of opaque predicates. Moreover,
we demonstrate flaws in proposed hardware opaque
predicate implementations.
• Hardware Trojan Injection. In our second case study
(Sect. IV and Sect. V), we demonstrate how benign
designs of Present and A5/1 can be surreptitiously
weakened. In particular, we provide novel aspects
on how these cryptographic algorithms can be auto-
matically reverse engineered and custom-tailored key
leakage mechanism that allow a man-in-the-middle
eavesdropper to decrypt any communication.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Our work builds on previous research in IP protection,
reverse engineering, and hardware Trojans. Below, we present
a concise technical background and related work on each area.
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A. IP Protection
The design of digital systems involves valuable effort in
terms of manpower and money. To reduce both production
time and costs, the reuse of IP design components is a
common practice. Unfortunately, the protection of the IP
owner’s rights becomes a major problem [11]. In recent years,
various solutions have been proposed to protect valuable IP [12].
Generally, there exists numerous defenses (e.g., watermarking
or fingerprinting) targeting different attacks (e.g., overbuilding
or cloning).
B. Hardware Reverse Engineering
Hardware reverse engineering can be generally divided in
FPGA and ASIC-oriented techniques. In the reverse engineering
context of FPGAs existing works can be mainly divided into
bitstream reverse engineering to recover the netlist, and netlist
reverse engineering to recover high-level Register Transfer
Level (RTL) information. Obtaining of the bitstream from a
deployed SRAM-based FPGA requires to extracting it from the
storing non-volatile memory. While several works developed
automated file format reverse engineering techniques to recover
the (partial) bitstream, c.f. [13], there also exist works on
directly selecting the bitstream as an target for manipulations,
c.f. [14], [15]. Although prominent FPGAs provide bitstream
encryption to achieve confidentiality, it could be shown that in
many cases this encryption can be circumvented [16], [17]. In
the case of ASIC netlist reverse engineering several different
areas of research can be divided. Where one area focuses on
recovering high-level extraction [18], [19], [20], [21], other
works elaborate on best practices for a human analyst [22].
C. Hardware Trojans
After the publication of the initial Department of Defense
(DoD) report [23] the research community started to investigate
both offensive and defensive aspects of malicious hardware
manipulations [7], [8].
Defense-driven research focuses on the detection of hard-
ware Trojans using several characteristic properties [24], [25].
Albeit, Zhang et al. [26] were able to present a solution to
evade detection algorithms targeting the netlist. In contrast to
the defense-driven side much less work has been performed on
the attack-driven side. The majority of proposed Trojan designs
are inserted during the design phase while accessing high-
level information [10]. Furthermore there are several works
target novel Trojan design methodologies such as dopant-level
Trojans [27], analog malicious hardware [28], or parametric
Trojans [29].
D. Attacker Model
We suppose that the adversary has access to a flattened
gate-level netlist without any high-level information such as
names, module hierarchies, and synthesis options. The goal of
the adversary is to perform an illegitimate application such as
hardware Trojan injection or IP infringement. In consequence
the attacker has to at least partially reverse-engineer the design.
Note that our adversary model is realistic in multiple
scenarios, i.e. SRAM-based FPGAs (since the netlist can be
recovered from a bitstream [30]) and malicious foundries.
III. CASE STUDY: WATERMARKING
In this case study, we present how IP infringement can be
performed for watermark protected designs. To demonstrate the
efficacy of gate-level netlist reverse engineering, we analyze
a scheme which aims to protect valuable FPGA IP cores at
netlist level.
A. LUT-based Watermarking
As described in Sect. II, various works have addressed IP
protection by use of watermarks. In particular, constraint-based
watermarking [31] is suited for FPGAs since the additional
satisfiability constraints are suited for the Look-up table (LUT)-
based FPGA structures [32].
Watermarking Scheme [32]. The high-level idea of the
scheme by Schmid et al. is to exploit not addressable LUT
memory space, see Fig. 1. Since input pin I1 is connected to
GND, there are 48 Bits that can be arbitrarily changed without
altering any functionality of the design. These LUT memory
bits are used to embed the watermark.
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Figure 1: Example of a LUT-6. I0 to I5 are input pins, and
O is the output pin. I4 and I5 are connected to GND. Bits
marked with X can be used for watermarks.
Reverse Engineering. In order to identify the LUT memory
bits which implement the watermark, we analyze the Boolean
function of each LUT. More precisely, we inspect each clause
of a LUT’s Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF). If there is any
clause where an GND or VCC input signal is required to
be logical 1 or 0, respectively, we successfully identified a
watermark bit. We practically verified that we are able to
automatically disclose the watermark of our target design (an
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) IP core synthesized for
an xc6slx16 with Xilinx ISE 14.7). Furthermore, we are able to
automatically remove and alter the watermark in the gate-level
netlist.
Note that Schmid et al. [32] proposed to utilize LUTs
configured as shift register LUTs to prevent optimization, but
since the shift-enable input pin is assigned to GND (to ensure
the designs functionality), we treat them as general LUTs in
our reverse engineering algorithm.
B. Opaque Predicates
Even though Schmid et al. [32] noted that the security
can be increased by use of bogus constant generating signals
(instead of the plain connection to GND), it appears challenging
how such signals can be implemented with consideration of a
reasonable reverse engineer.
To this end, we propose to leverage opaque predicates which
have been mainly used in the context of software watermarking
and obfuscation [33]. An opaque predicate is an expression
that either evaluates to true or false irregardless of the input
and thus this function implements a constant generating signal.
Hence, instead of GND the unused LUT’s input pins (e.g., I5
and I6 in Fig. 1) are connected to the output of an opaque
predicate which mitigates our reverse engineering approach
presented in the previous section. Despite numerous works that
address opaque predicates for software, there is to the best
of our knowledge only one work by Sergeichik et al. [34]
applying them to the hardware reverse engineering context.
Implementation [34]. To implement opaque predicates,
Sergeichik et al. suggest to exploit Linear Feedback Shift
Registers (LFSRs) as constant signal generators. Their general
idea is to connect all registers of the LFSR to an OR or NOR
gate to generate a constant high or low signal, respectively.
Note that the standard LFSR with XOR feedback never enter
the zero state (where all registers hold a logic 0) thus there is
at least one register which holds a logic 1.
Reverse Engineering. Even though the reverse engineering
strategy from the previous section is generally prevented by
opaque predicates, the proposed opaque predicate instantiation
by LFSRs is not sufficient to mitigate reverse engineering and
thus IP infringement is again possible. The high-level idea of
our automated reverse engineering strategy is to identify LFSRs
and subsequently whether they are used to implement constant
generators. For the detection of LFSRs, we exploit their typical
characteristic: a chain of Flip Flops (FFs) elements to store
and shift the current state. Note that we skip any pass-through
LUTs or buffers in each step. To find the FF chains, we search
for the initial FF (which stores the next state bit) by checking
whether its preceding gate is a FF. For any candidate, we
execute a modified Depth-First Search (DFS), and we search
for circles considering taps defined by the underlying feedback
polynomial of the LFSR. Since we can identify the position
of the initial FF and the taps, we are able to algorithmically
identify the feedback polynomial as well.
After the LFSRs are automatically reverse engineered, we
topologically analyze each LFSR for the constant generator
part, i.e. an OR or NOR gate that is connected to all registers
of the LFSR. Note that the OR and NOR gates might be
implemented across multiple LUTs depending on the type and
size of the LFSR. To identify the final constant generation
gate, we manually inspected our target design (an AES IP core
synthesized for an xc6slx16 with Xilinx ISE 14.7) which
typically requires only several minutes but can be easily
automated. In case other types of LFSRs such as XNOR-based
LFSRs [34], the search for the final constant generation gate
has to be adapted.
In summary, LUT-based watermarking is a promising
approach to protect valuable FPGA IP and particularly in
combination with advanced hardware obfuscation techniques
it might provide an adequate security level to hamper reverse
engineering.
IV. CASE STUDY: BLOCK CIPHERS
This case study presents an approach to detect and weaken
block ciphers using Substitution-Boxes (S-Boxes). Here, we
extend the technique described in Swierczynski et al. [14]
by weakening block ciphers normally found in space and
power constraint Internet of Things (IoT) devices on the netlist
level. By an example we describe the reverse engineering and
Trojan injection process for an FPGA based design for an
Xilinx Spartan-6 device. Using PRESENT [35] as the targeted
design we demonstrate an fully algorithmic solution to detect
(Sect. IV-A) and weaken (Sect. IV-B) the S-Boxes of the
implementation, even if the S-Box logic is merged with the
control logic of a design.
Block Ciphers. In modern systems block ciphers like
AES are the standard for symmetrically encrypted commu-
nication. In contrast to asymmetric ciphers, many prominent
symmetric schemes use a Substitution Permutation Network
(SPN) structure which allows a higher data throughput. In
combination with asymmetric schemes, which enable the on-
demand key generation over an untrusted channel, they allow
the encryption of plaintext in blocks of several bytes. In contrast
to stream ciphers, where each bit is encrypted independently,
block ciphers use a predefined block size to specify the
amount of data that is encrypted at once. The SPN structure
consists here of alternative substitutions and permutations. The
characteristic non-linear nature of each S-Box leads to a specific
representation in the synthesized FPGA netlist.
PRESENT cipher. Although AES is the de-facto standard
for block-ciphers, due to it size it has some drawbacks in
constrained scenarios, as smart-cards, medical, or battery
powered IoT devices. One prominent cipher to use in this
context is the PRESENT cipher. In contrast to AES, which
uses a 8-bit to 8-bit S-Box, it uses a 4-bit to 4-bit S-Box while
increasing the number of rounds. For LUT-6 architectures,
LUTs with six inputs and (usually) one output, like Spartan-6
the S-Box logic can be potentially merged by the synthesizer.
Here two input pins are not used by the S-Box logic and can
therefore be freely used by the synthesizer to reduce the space
consumption of a design.
In the following we discuss our approach based on
Swierczynski et al. [14] of detecting S-Boxes in FPGA
bitstreams, and extend it to detect merged S-Boxes on the
netlist level. Therefore we facilitate an existing PRESENT
implementation [36] and utilize Xilinx ISE 14.7 to produce a
gate-level, Hardware Description Language (HDL)-based netlist
of the implementation. Such a modification can be of interest
to extract the secret key from a Device Under Test (DUT), like
an Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drive, discussed in [37].
A. S-Box detection
In contrast to AES, where one LUT-6 is not able to represent
the calculation of one S-Box output bit, PRESENT using a 4-to-
4 S-Box allows the implementation in one LUT and also allows
two bits to be freely used by the synthesizer. Alg. 1 provides
an approach to generate the LUT-4 based output pattern, LUTs
with four inputs and one output, for the PRESENT cipher. In
order to search for these pattern in the LUT-6 based netlist
we iterate over all LUT elements and need to extract the sub-
configurations by sequentially removing one input bit from the
LUT equation. Here we iterate over all combinations of two
input pin tuples and generate the sub-pattern, c.f. Alg. 2. In
our case we were able to detect 68 S-Box implementation, 64
for each bit of a state and four used by the key-schedule.
Algorithm 1 PRESENT S-Box pattern generation for a LUT-6
FPGA architecture
Input: Present S-Box sbox
Input: Number of input bits used for the S-Box l
Output: Vector of all configuration for PRESENT LUTs v
Map of all permutation to the generated configuration vector
m
S-Box value at position n sbox[n]
1: for i := 0; i < 2l; + + i do
2: for p in Bitpermutations of i do
3: m[p].push back(sbox[p])
4: return m.values()
Algorithm 2 LUT Sub-Configuration Generator for FPGA
based designs
Input: Configuration to decompose orig conf
Input: Vector of input pins to sequentially remove from
configuration: p
Output: Vector of all generated Sub-Configurations s
Output: Vector of pins in order of removal v
Vector of Configuration: r
Number of Input Pins for Configuration c:
c.input pin size()
Access i’th Bit of Number n (MSB at position: 0): n[i]
1: r.push back(orig conf)
2: while !p.empty() do
3: pin := p.take first()
4: v.push back(pin)
5: Intermediate Vector of Configurations r tmp := r
6: for c in r tmp do
7: Configuration Vector µ1, µ2
8: l := c.input pin size()
9: for n = 0;n < 2l; + + n do
10: if n[p] == 0 then
11: µ0.push back(c[n])
12: else
13: µ1.push back(c[n])
14: r tmp.push back(µ0)
15: r tmp.push back(µ1)
16: r := r tmp
17: return r, v
B. Trojan implementation
In order to weaken the provided design we altered the
Boolean function for each pattern to return the identity function
(input S-Box = output S-Box), which removes the non-linearity
property of PRESENT. Here we again utilized the algorithm
Alg. 1 by replacing the standard PRESENT S-Box by the
identity S-Box. During the pattern search phase we now collect
all sub-configurations for each LUT-6 element and replace
the identified sub-pattern by the equivalent identity S-Box
configuration based on the detected input pattern. Afterwards
the partial equations of the LUT needs to be recombined, c.f.
Alg. 3 Finally the resulting LUT-6 configuration is written back
Algorithm 3 LUT Sub-configuration Merger for FPGA based
designs
Input: Vector of Sub-Configurations s
Input: Vector of pins in order of removal v
Output: Merged LUT configuration m
Number of input pins for configuration c:
c.input pin size()
Access i’th bit of number n (MSB at position: 0): n[i]
1: while s.size() > 1 do
2: pin := v.take first()
3: Configuration Vector µ1, µ2
4: µ0 := s.take first()
5: µ1 := s.take first()
6: Merged configuration: merged
7: µ0 counter := 0
8: µ1 counter := 0
9: l := c.input pin size() + 1
10: for n = 0;n < 2l; + + n do
11: if n[p] == 0 then
12: merged.push back(µ0[µ0 counter ++])
13: else
14: merged.push back(µ1[µ1 counter ++])
15: return m = s.take first()
to the textual netlist representation.
In summary, the presented detection and modification
approach allows the modification of any provided S-Box
implementation in FPGA architectures. Complementary to
Swierczynski et al. we demonstrated ways to also handle S-Box
logic merged with e.g. control logic. In consequence, this allows
the detection and weakening of S-Box based block ciphers for
FPGA based designs.
V. CASE STUDY: STREAM CIPHERS
In this case study, we show how to algorithmically reverse
engineer LFSR-based stream ciphers (Sect. V-A) and inject a
Trojan into a third-party gate-level netlist based solely on the
information inferred from reverse engineering (Sect. V-B).
A. LFSR-based Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are an important class of widely used en-
cryption algorithms (e.g., in timing-critical voice transmission),
since the encryption consists of a simple XOR-ing with a
keystream. In practice, various stream ciphers are based on
LFSRs such as E0 in the Bluetooth standard [38], A5/1 in
GSM [39], or SNOW 3G in UMTS 3G [40]. LFSRs are
advantageous since their implementation is lightweight and
are mathematically well understood, see [41]. In addition, non-
linear elements such as a non-linear combination of the output
from multiple LFSRs are used to increase the security of a
stream cipher.
A5/1 Stream Cipher. The A5/1 algorithm was defined
for use in GSM networks and is supposed to guarantee data
confidentiality for cellphone calls, however, severe flaws have
been detected and various attacks proposed [42] [43] [44].
Besides cryptanalytic attacks, it has been shown that A5/1
can be broken in practice within seconds when using a pre-
calculated table of ciphertext and plaintext pairs (rainbow tables)
[45]. Note that our goal is not to demonstrate a cryptanalytic
attack by exploiting inherent weaknesses of the A5/1 cipher, but
to exemplify how the security of any LFSR-based stream cipher
can be undermined by exploiting the underlying LFSR-based
architecture.
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Figure 2: Block diagram of the A5/1 cipher.
A5/1’s architectural core consists of three LFSRs, see Fig. 2.
The outputs of these LFSRs are XOR-ed and the output in turn
is used as bit for the keystream. The LFSRs, L1, L2 and L3,
have lengths of 19, 22 and 21 bits, respectively. To achieve an
unpredictable output, they are clocked irregularly. To determine
which LFSR exactly will be clocked, a so-called majority
function is deployed. At positions 8 for L1, 10 for L2 and L3,
the bits of the current state are tapped to determine whether 0
or 1 is in the majority. Each LFSR that contains the majority
bit in aforementioned position will then be clocked. Before bits
for the keystream are generated, a key must be loaded as initial
state of the LFSRs. This ensures the output is unpredictable.
Besides a 64-bit key, a public 22-bit frame number is loaded
to the LFSRs by means of feeding the respective bit into all
three LFSRs and subsequently clocking them. This creates an
unpredictable initial configuration of the LFSRs. The majority
function is then activated and the LFSRs are clocked 100 times
without any keystream output being produced [46].
Reverse Engineering. To automatically reverse engineer
A5/1 in a gate-level design, we use an extended approach
of the LFSR detection presented in Sect. III. In particular,
we search for the specified LFSR lengths and the search for
the XOR gate that performs the combination of plaintext
and keystream. We have practically verified the correctness
of our algorithm on an open-source third-party IP core [47]
synthesized with Xilinx ISE 14.7 for an xc6slx16. Note that we
integrated the encryption/decryption functionality by addition of
the XOR with the plaintext/ciphertext to possess a fully-fledged
cryptographic core.
B. Hardware Trojan
In order to surreptitiously weaken the cipher, we show how
to inject a hardware Trojan into the design’s gate-level netlist.
The goal of our Trojan is to leak the cryptographic key over
the available communication channel.
Trigger. As a result of our previous analysis, we know the
exact position of the LFSRs, thus we easily can attach them
to our Trojan circuitry. Note that we additionally wire-tap a
control signal which indicate whether the A5/1 core is ready
to encrypt or decrypt user data. Once this signal is set to high
it triggers our Trojan and we load a copy of the current 64-bit
state of the LFSRs to our Trojan circuitry.
Payload. The high-level idea of our payload is that the
first 64-bit of the ciphertext is the employed 64-bit state of
the LFSR. To this end, we added a multiplexer after the final
XOR gate, see Fig. 3 and a counter to our Trojan. For the first
64 ciphertext bits, we output the stored keystream and thus a
man-in-the-middle can decrypt any user data.
L1
L2
L3
FSM
FSM
Trojan
keystream
done_loading
Figure 3: High-level design of the A5/1 Trojan.
One may argue that a user will notice that the encryption
failed, as it cannot be decrypted properly. While this is true,
we point to the fact that a transmission is organized in bursts
of 114 bits. All 4.615 ms (∼ 217 times a second) a burst is
sent [39], so that the single unreadable burst will likely be
unnoticed.
In summary, automated reverse engineering of LFSR-based
stream ciphers and subsequent hardware Trojan injection is not
as challenging as one might think. Due the general nature of
our detection algorithm, our approach can be used on basically
any LFSR-based stream cipher.
VI. CONCLUSION
Various works have highlighted the threats in modern
Integrated Circuits production chain. Diverse threats such as IP
infringement and injection of hardware Trojans require (partial)
reverse engineering of the design.
In this work, we presented how automated reverse en-
gineering supports arbitrary destructive aspects. First, we
provided a reviewed constrained IP watermarking scheme for
FPGAs and improved the security by use of opaque predicates.
Additionally, we revealed that proposed hardware opaque
predicate implementations are not sufficiently secure against
reverse engineering. Second, we provided automated reverse
engineering strategies to detect cryptographic implementations
and simultaneously inject malicious circuitry in third-party gate-
level netlists. Our injected hardware Trojan exploits available
communication channels, thus a man-in-the-middle is able to
decrypt any communication.
Since our attacks are performed automatically, we believe
that our work raises the awareness of the real-world attacker’s
capabilities targeting cryptographic designs and watermarking
schemes.
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